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One of the landmark events in the recent history of Cyprus was the adoption of the 
euro on 1 January 2008.  A crucial element of the preparatory discussions between 
the Cypriot authorities and the competent European bodies was the search for an 
agreement on the conversion rate of the Cyprus pound vis-à-vis the euro, which was 
decided by the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) on 10 July 2007.  
This paper describes part of the work undertaken at the Central Bank of Cyprus as 
background material for these discussions.  Using a qualitative and quantitative 
approach, the paper suggests that the exchange parity rate of the Cyprus pound   
vis-à-vis the euro which existed for a number of years prior to euro adoption was 
broadly in line with economic fundamentals.  Evidence examined include the 
stability of the Cyprus pound vis-à-vis the euro within a credible exchange rate 
policy framework, robust growth, low levels of unemployment, high Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) coverage of the current account deficit as well as low and stable 
inflation.  This conclusion is also supported by a model-based approach using the 
Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER) framework.   
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1.  Introduction 
The concept of the equilibrium exchange rate has historically attracted 
considerable interest by both academic economists and policymakers.   
Following the establishment of the European Monetary System in the 1970s 
and, more recently, the launch of the Economic Monetary Union (EMU) in 
1999, the concept’s importance in the European Union (EU) has increased 
significantly. In the context of recent EU enlargement, new member states are 
expected to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) some time after 
accession and, after having satisfied the Maastricht convergence criteria, they 
are expected to adopt the euro.  These institutional arrangements in Europe 
have resulted in extensive discussions on exchange rate issues.  In particular, 
the focus has been on equilibrium exchange rates in the context of joining an 
exchange rate mechanism, and then a monetary union, with an appropriate 
and sustainable exchange rate in line with the economic fundamentals.  The 
importance of the issue is highlighted by the costly experience of currency 
misalignments in ERM in the early 1990s.   
  At the time of finalising the technical work presented in this paper in 
the first half of 2007, Denmark and six new member states, namely Estonia, 
Lithuania, Cyprus, Latvia, Malta and Slovakia were members of ERM II, while 
Slovenia had already adopted the euro on 1 January 2007, following more than 
two years of successful participation in ERM II.  In the case of Cyprus, the 
Cyprus pound joined ERM II in May 2005 with a view to early euro adoption.  
This was realised on 1 January 2008.   
The purpose of this paper is to examine the issue of the equilibrium 
exchange rate of the Cyprus pound in the period leading to euro adoption on 1 
January 2008, and to lay down the relevant parameters which were analysed in 
view of the need to identify the appropriate exchange rate for joining EMU.  
The bulk of the work in this paper was undertaken prior to the final decision 
by ECOFIN on the irrevocable exchange rate between the Cyprus pound and 
the euro on 10 July 2007. The results and conclusions of this work were part of 
the policy discussions that preceded the decision1.    
The paper is organised as follows:  Section 2 contains background 
information on developments in the Cyprus economy during the period 
leading to the 10 July 2007 decision and sets the stage for the subsequent main 
discussion.  Section 3 focuses on the analysis of a number of indicators, which 
were useful for the qualitative assessment of the appropriateness of the 
 
1 Similar technical work was also conducted for the period leading to ERM II entry on 29 April 2005, with 
data covering the period up to the year 2004. The main conclusions of that work are similar to that of the 
updated work, namely that the central parity between the Cyprus pound and the euro in the period 
leading to ERM II entry was broadly  in line with the fundamental equilibrium.  
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exchange rate parity of the Cyprus pound in the reference period. To 
complement the qualitative assessment, Section 4 presents the results of an 
econometric model, namely the FEER model2.  Section 5 provides concluding 
comments and discusses a number of forward considerations relevant to the 
exchange rate issue in conjunction with competitiveness considerations for 
Cyprus.   Finally, an appendix presents some post-euro adoption reflections, 
with the hindsight of assessing developments two years after the euro 
adoption. 
 
2.  The Cyprus economy: macroeconomic and structural background 
In the three subsections that follow, the overall macroeconomic background of 
the economy is presented for the period leading to the date of the decision for 
euro adoption, that is the period of a few years up to the first half of 2007.  A 
description of the exchange rate framework and developments in Cyprus 
follows, and finally in the last subsection some structural features of the 
economy are discussed.  These features are often analysed in order to assess 
the ability of an economy to participate in a monetary union. 
 
2.1 Economic developments and prospects in the period leading  to the 
      decision for euro adoption 
Cyprus is a small and open economy which, since its independence in 1960, 
has exhibited solid growth within a broadly stable and market-oriented 
macroeconomic environment.  In 2006 per capita income, measured in 
Purchasing Power Standards (PPS), reached around three quarters of the euro 
area average.  The economy is service-oriented, with the tertiary sectors 
(including legal, accounting and financial services as well as shipping and 
tourism) accounting for about three quarters of GDP.  The overall 
macroeconomic performance of the economy has been characterised by 
moderate inflation and low unemployment, despite the influx of foreign 
workers in recent years, accounting for 16% of the labour force in 2006.   
Moreover, the economy has historically registered manageable levels of fiscal 
and current account deficits, with the external debt service to exports ratio and 
foreign reserves being at comfortable levels. 
In the context of EU accession, which took place on 1 May 2004, Cyprus 
underwent substantial structural reforms, which contributed to the better 
functioning of the economy and set the stage for the achievement of nominal 
and real convergence.  These reforms also contributed to the further 
integration of Cyprus in the EU economy, which constituted an important 
 
2 The original background work by the authors for the 2005 and the 2007 exchange rate parity decisions 
include a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exercise, which is not presented here.  
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element for successful participation in the euro area.  For instance, one can 
point to the gradual three-phased liberalisation of capital controls, completed 
on 1 May 2004, and the harmonisation of the monetary policy framework with 
that of the European Central Bank (ECB), which had been in place for some 
years.  Within the context of the latter policy framework, the Central Bank of 
Cyprus (CBC) became fully independent in 2002, with a monetary policy 
framework fully consistent with that of the ECB including its primary goal of 
maintaining price stability.  The overall progress in achieving real convergence 
and implementing structural reforms in Cyprus in the period leading to euro 
adoption, was highlighted in the European Commission’s Broad Economic 
Guidelines reports (e.g. Commission of the European Communities, 2004). 
Table 1 presents a snapshot of Cyprus’s macroeconomic developments 
that prevailed in the years prior to euro adoption, i.e. 2000-2007. For 2007 the 
table includes both the final yearly figures and the estimated figures for the 
year at the time of euro adoption discussions, that is mid-2007. This table 
constitutes the reference point for the discussion of the macroeconomic 
background of the Cypriot economy, which follows below. 
With regard to growth, the Cyprus economy performed well, growing 
at an average rate of 3,8% over the period 2000-2007.  This was much higher 
than the EU and euro area average. Being a small and open economy, growth 
in Cyprus was also affected significantly by adverse external developments 
during this period. For instance, in 2002 and 2003 the economy was affected by 
the weak international economic environment and exhibited a slowdown in 
growth, with foreign demand falling significantly mainly as a result of the 
adverse developments in the tourism sector. In line with the improvement of 
the international economic environment, growth in Cyprus during 2004-2006 
rebounded, but was mainly driven by domestic demand.  The growth 
prospects for 2007 were equally favourable due to the positive economic 
environment in Europe and strong domestic demand fuelled partly by the 
anticipation of euro adoption.   
Table 1:  Selected economic indicators for Cyprus, 2000-2007 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2006* 2007** 2007***
Gross Domestic Product (Real Growth)  % change  5,0 4,0 2,1 1,9 4,2 3,9 4,1 3,8 4,2 5,1
 Unemployment rate (LFS) %change 5,0 4,0 3,3 4,1 4,7 5,3 4,5 - 4,2 3,9
Inflation rate  % change  4,1 2,0 2,8 4,1 2,3 2,6 2,5 2,5 - 2,4
Harmonised inflation rate % change  4,9 2,0 2,8 4,0 1,9 2,1 2,2 2,2 2,5 2,2
Current account balance % of GDP -5,3 -3,3 -3,7 -2,2 -5,0 -5,9 -7,0 5,9 -5,8 -11,7
New FDI flows % of GDP 7,3 7,2 5,1 2,4 2,5 3,7 5,2 - - 4,6
Official international reserves € billion 2,0 2,7 3,0 2,7 3,0 3,7 4,5 - - 4,4
General government surplus (+) deficit (-) % of GDP -2,3 -2,2 -4,4 -6,5 -4,1 -2,4 -1,2 - 1,5 3,5
Domestic public debt % of GDP 44,5 48,4 51,4 53,5 51,1 52,0 50,4 - - 44,9
Foreign public debt % of GDP 14,3 12,3 13,2 15,5 19,1 17,0 14,2 - - 13,4
Total public debt % of GDP 58,8 60,7 64,6 68,9 70,2 69,1 64,6 - 60,5 58,3   
Source: CBC. 
*  Preliminary data for 2006 used in the FEER estimations 
**  Estimates according to the stability programme 2007 
*** Final  data 
 
Inflation has historically been moderate in Cyprus, in part owing to the 
pursued exchange rate policy (see next section).  The inflation spikes recorded 
in 2002 and 2003 mainly reflected increases in the standard rate of value added 
tax (VAT), from 10% to 13% on 1 July 2002 and from 13% to 15% on 1 January 
2003, as well as other harmonisation-induced increases in excise taxes in 2002 
and 2003 (see Figure 1).  Various measures of core inflation3  indicate that 
during recent years underlying inflation in Cyprus hovered mostly between 
2% and 2,5%.  In 2007 inflation remained at 2,4%, as the increases in oil and 
food prices were counterbalanced by the impact of a decline in the excise tax 
on motor vehicles in November 2006.   
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As regards the labour market, the economy had been growing at almost 
full employment conditions in recent years with the unemployment level being 
among the lowest in Europe.  The number of registered unemployed as a 
proportion of the economically active population exhibited limited variation in 
recent years, levelling at 3% in 2007.  Besides the measure of registered 
unemployment, which has been available on a monthly basis since 1960, 
u n e m p l o y m e n t  i n  C y p r u s  i s  a l s o  m e a s ured using the Labour Force Survey 
(LFS).  The LFS measure is considered to be a more appropriate measure 
comparable with those in other countries as it is based on the internationally 
accepted International Labour Organisation (ILO) definition.  Quarterly data 
on a yearly basis which are systematically available from 2004 onwards4, also 
indicate low levels of unemployment compared with the EU average, albeit of 
a higher magnitute than the measure of registered unemployment.5   
On the fiscal front, a sharp deterioration in public finances was recorded 
in 2002 and 2003, partly due to the aforementioned slowdown in economic 
activity.  The widening of the fiscal deficit was also attributable to the adverse 
impact of a major tax reform in July 2002, through which increased revenue 
from hikes in VAT were more than offset by a reduction in income tax rates 
and an increase in social expenditure.  In 2004 the situation was clearly 
reversed and a downward path for the fiscal deficit was achieved. The fiscal 
deficit declined gradually to 1,2% in 2006, in line with the objective of fulfilling 
the relevant Maastricht criterion6.  In 2007 the fiscal balance turned positive, 
reflecting buoyant economic activity and increased revenue from real estate 
activity. 
On the external front, non-negligible but manageable current account 
deficits were recorded, ranging from -5,3% to -7% of GDP in 2000 and 2007, 
respectively.  These deficits were partly dependent on exogenous or one-off 
factors such as the increase in the price of oil and the change in the 
classification of excise taxes for cars in November 2006, which resulted in a 
surge of car imports in 2007.  Furthermore, a construction boom, which started 
soon after EU accession, contributed significantly to the worsening of the 
current account deficit. 
As far as the financing of the current account is concerned, it was to a 
large extent non debt-creating.  The current account deficit in Cyprus was 
 
3  Core inflation is defined here as a measure of inflation which excludes variations in the prices of 
agricultural and petroleum products and ignores the impact of changes in indirect taxes. 
4 Data is also available for the second quarter of 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003  
5 On the differences between the two measures of unemployment in Cyprus see Kyriacou et al 2009. 
6 The fiscal consolidation since 2004 was based in part on a number of revenue measures, such as income 
from a bank secrecy and tax amnesty scheme.  Furthermore, notable expenditure containment was 
achieved.    
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financed through FDI (see Table 1) and to a lesser extent by portfolio and other 
investments. 
 
2.2 Exchange rate policy in Cyprus up to 2007  
Exchange rate policy in Cyprus was historically geared towards maintaining 
macroeconomic stability through the linkage of the Cyprus pound with a 
currency anchor, either a single currency or a basket of currencies.  The 
currency anchor changed several times.  During the period of 1963 – 1972 the 
Cyprus pound was pegged to sterling.  As a result of the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, this link was terminated in 1972 
and the Cyprus currency was linked for a short period to the dollar.  The 
Cyprus pound was subsequently linked to an import-weighted currency 
basket during the period 1973-1984 and to a trade-weighted currency basket 
during the period 1984-1992.  
On 19 June 1992, the Cyprus pound was unilaterally pegged to the ecu, 
at the central rate of CYP1=ECU 1,7086, with fluctuation margins of ±2,25%.  
Following the smooth ecu-peg policy, the Cyprus pound was subsequently 
pegged to the euro on 1 January 1999, with the same central parity.  Initially, 
the fluctuation bands were maintained at ±2,25%.  On 1 January 2001, together 
with the abolition of the long–standing and statutory interest rate ceiling, 
wider bands of ±15% were introduced in order to enable the CBC to absorb 
any shocks from possible destabilising capital movements and to deter 
speculative capital flows resulting from capital account liberalisation. At the 
same time, the narrower softer bands of ±2,25% were temporarily maintained 
to help anchor prices and expectations.  In order to curb excessive borrowing 
in euros by residents who were taking advantage of the interest rate 
differentials between debts denominated in Cyprus pounds and euros, the 
softer bands were abolished on 13 August 2001.  The ±15% margins became the 
effective limits, in line with ERM II.  Even though exchange rate policy became 
more flexible through the abandonment of the narrow margins, the actual 
fluctuations of the Cyprus pound against the euro continued to be small, 
broadly remaining within ±2,25% until the last day of the pound’s existence. 
There are a number of reasons why the fixed exchange rate policy 
framework described above was deemed appropriate.  Cyprus is a service-
oriented small and open economy with a high degree of import dependence.  
Potential gains from a possible nominal devaluation would tend to be largely 
offset by higher import prices, including the prices of petroleum products and 
other raw materials.  This would in turn fuel inflation, thus undermining the 
price competitiveness of the country's exports of goods and services.  It should 
be underlined that the pass-through process from a devaluation to higher  
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inflation was likely to be particularly rapid in the case of Cyprus because of the 
existence of the cost of living adjustment (COLA) system, which applies to 
most wages and pension benefits twice a year, and also because of the close to 
full employment conditions that prevailed in the country for many years.   
Partly as a result of these characteristics of the economy, the Cypriot 
authorities did not actively use the exchange rate instrument to address 
macroeconomic challenges or to buttress economic growth.  Even in the 
extreme case of the 1974 Turkish invasion of the island, which constituted a 
major adverse shock to the economy, the exchange rate tool was not used.   
Instead, one of the major measures undertaken at the time to help the economy 
rebound was a wage reduction by 20% for three years and a concomitant 
suspension of the COLA system.    
It should be noted that when the Cyprus pound was devalued in 1967 
following sterling’s devaluation7 by about 13% vis-à-vis the US dollar, the 
impact on the Cyprus economy was in fact negative.  Inflation during the 
subsequent five years deteriorated compared with the five-year period before 
the devaluation, while at the same time neither GDP growth nor the current 
account balance had shown any improvement; in fact they exhibited some 
worsening.   
Finally, as regards the implementation of exchange rate policy prior to 
euro adoption, a noteworthy development in 2004 should be mentioned, 
namely the short-lived pressure on the Cyprus pound during April, the month 
prior to EU accession.  This pressure arose in anticipation of the referendum on 
the UN sponsored plan for the reunification of Cyprus which took place on 23 
April.  In view of the politically charged and uncertain environment prior to 
the referendum and in anticipation of the full liberalisation of capital controls 
on 1 May, relatively small but persistent amounts of capital outflows were 
recorded against the background of unfounded rumours of an imminent 
devaluation.  In response, on 30 April 2004 the CBC raised the marginal 
lending facility by 100 basis points to 5.5%.  Rates were then kept unchanged 
until 25 February 2005 when they were reduced by 25 basis points, with capital 
flows returning to ‘normal’ levels and the Cyprus pound appreciating 
marginally by April 2005, just prior to ERM II entry.  Thereafter, and until euro 
adoption, the Cyprus pound fluctuated within narrow margins around the 
central parity vis-à-vis the euro, exhibiting a marginal appreciation. 
 
2.3  Other structural features and euro area prospects  
The discussion so far has highlighted macroeconomic evidence suggesting the 
readiness of Cyprus to become a member of the euro area.  The level of real 
 
7 At that time the Cyprus pound was linked to sterling.  
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convergence, both in terms of per capita income and in terms of the high 
degree of market orientation of the economy, as well as the macroeconomic 
stability described earlier, constituted strong arguments in favour of Cyprus 
during the discussions for euro area entry. In addition, a number of other 
structural characteristics of the economy reinforced further the argument and 
provided more evidence of the readiness of the Cyprus economy to face the 
challenges associated with euro area membership. These characteristics mainly 
related to the robustness of the financial sector, the flexibility of the labour 
market and the degree of business cycle synchronisation vis-à-vis the 
European economies and particularly the euro area countries.  
As regards the first structural characteristic, it is well known from the 
literature that a country joining a monetary union must do so with a healthy 
and robust financial sector.  The progress achieved by Cyprus on this front 
prior to euro adoption was significant.  Both the banking and the wider 
financial sector were fully compatible and harmonised with the acquis, while 
the legal, regulatory and supervisory frameworks were fully aligned with the 
relevant EU directives.  Banks were also in good shape to meet fully the 
requirements of the new capital adequacy framework which were 
implemented by the EU at the end of 2006. 
Despite a difficult year in 20038, Cyprus’s domestic banks remained 
financially sound during the period leading to euro adoption, backed by a 
strong capital base.  Furthermore, the high quality of human resources, the 
increasing range of products and services offered as well as the buoyant 
economic performance in the years leading to euro adoption, contributed 
positively to the long-term prospects of banks and increased profitability. 
As regards the second structural characteristic, namely labour market 
flexibility, this is regarded as one of the crucial factors that can enable a 
member of a monetary union to face the challenges associated with the 
management of asymmetric shocks.  As mentioned earlier, despite the 
existence of the COLA system, the Cypriot labour market is very flexible (see 
IMF, 1996 and 2005b, and Backe and Thimann, 2004).  This conclusion is also 
supported by the very low unemployment levels prevailing in the country as 
described in Section 2.1.  A factor underpinning the flexibility of the labour 
market, especially in recent years, is the significant and increasing influx of 
foreign workers to the island, amounting to 16% of the labour force by 2006.  
Evidence for the role of foreign labour in dampening wage pressures is 
 
8 During 2003 the prolonged slowdown in the world economy and in Cyprus, the reduction in interest 
rates, the war in Iraq, the decline in tourist arrivals and the underperformance of the stock market had a 
negative impact on the banking sector’s financial performance.    
provided by Michael et al (2006) who found a significant downward impact on 
sectoral wages of about 15%.   
An additional and equally important indicator of the readiness of 
Cyprus for the EMU, was the degree of business cycle synchronisation with 
respect to the euro area.  As shown in Figures 2a and 2b, growth variations in 
Cyprus were closely correlated with those of the EU in the period 1996-2006, 
particularly the euro area countries.  Table 2 presents the simple correlations 
between the GDP growth of selected euro area member countries and Cyprus 
vis-à-vis the euro area growth in the period 1996-2006.  As indicated in the 
table, the correlation of Cyprus’s GDP growth with that of the euro area 
average (0.72) is comparable with that of other individual euro area countries9.  
This also relates to the strong historical ties of Cyprus with Europe, 
particularly in services, and the progression of the island’s economy toward 
further EU integration, which had been accomplished through a demanding 
harmonisation process.  More specifically, recent evidence suggests that the 
shares of traded goods and services with EU countries both increased to 37%.  
More significantly, the share of FDI inflows from the EU increased to 85%.  
 
        Figure 2a: Business cycles, 1996-2006 
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Source: International Financial Statistics, (IMF). 
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9 It should also be recognised that the correlation of the growth of each individual euro area country with 
that of the euro area average is biased upwards, particularly for large economies, as the growth rates for 
these countries are themselves components of  the average euro area growth rate.   
Figure 2b:  Business cycles, 1996-2006 
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Source: International Financial Statistics, (IMF). 
All in all, the aforementioned structural characteristics of the economy 
provided support to the argument that the Cyprus economy was indeed 
mature and ready to operate smoothly in the euro area at the time of the euro 
adoption discussions. 
 
3. The equilibrium parity of the Cyprus pound: a qualitative assessment  
Having discussed the overall macroeconomic and structural background of 
Cyprus in the period leading to the decision for euro adoption, we now turn to 
the main question addressed in this paper, namely the assessment of the 
appropriateness of the exchange rate parity of the Cyprus pound in that 
period.  It is widely accepted that the notion of an equilibrium exchange rate is 
not only multidimensional but it is also extremely difficult to empirically 
determine with accuracy.  In view of this challenge, it is acknowledged that in 
order to formulate a thorough and robust view on the range of values within 
which the equilibrium exchange rate level lies, one should approach the issue 
from a variety of different perspectives and evaluate a number of alternative 
indicators and a wide range of models.  Against this background, a qualitative 
analysis of the issue is undertaken below by first examining a wide range of 
relevant indicators (Subsection 3.1) and then focusing on effective exchange 
rate indices (Subsection 3.2).  The analysis of this section is subsequently 
complemented by an econometric analysis in Section 4, which is based on a 
FEER model. 
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3.1  An assessment of a range of relevant indicators 
It can be asserted that the parity of the Cyprus pound was broadly in line with 
the economic fundamentals in the years leading to euro adoption.  This view 
has also been supported by independent observers.  One line of argument 
often used to support this view is the historical performance of the exchange 
rate of the Cyprus pound.  Even though historical performance is 
characterised by lasting exchange rate stability and full employment 
conditions, it is by no means a sufficient indicator nor does it secure a similar 
performance in the future.  Nevertheless, it provides useful information which 
can be assessed in conjunction with other relevant indicators and models.   
As already mentioned in the previous section, the pound was pegged to 
the ecu from 1992 to 1999, at the rate of CYP1=ECU1,7086, and to the euro 
since 1999, with the same central parity.  Fluctuations around the central parity 
were small, in most cases within the + 2,25% narrow margins.  In parallel with 
the observed exchange rate stability, the concurrent overall macroeconomic 
performance of the country was characterised by high rates of growth and low 
levels of unemployment as well as subdued inflation.  The broadly stable and 
full-employment conditions, along with the high import content of the 
production process in Cyprus, including almost total dependence on energy 
imports and inelastic import demand, suggest that the pursued policy served 
the economy well.  In support of this argument, net FDI inflows in recent years 
were very strong, albeit with high fluctuations (see Table 1). Furthermore, 
international reserves were at comfortable levels, reflecting the willingness and 
readiness of foreign investors to finance the current account deficit during the 
catching-up phase of the economy, which was speedy and smooth. 
Against the above argument, one could point to the existence of capital 
controls during the period prior to EU entry and their potential contribution in 
supporting a misaligned exchange rate parity.  Nevertheless, this argument is 
significantly weakened if one considers the long duration of the exchange rate 
framework and the high level of financial integration of the Cyprus economy 
with the rest of the world, particularly Europe.  It could be argued that no form 
of capital controls could have been so effective as to preserve a disequilibrium 
environment for so many years, particularly given the openness of the 
economy and its financial and cultural relations with the rest of the world.  It 
follows, therefore, that the value of the Cyprus pound was, on average, not 
significantly misaligned over the years.  This argument is also supported by 
the fact that despite the existence of an informal parallel foreign exchange 
market in Cyprus for most of the period under consideration, no  
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misalignments were ever reported.10  Also, the spot and forward exchange rate 
markets in Cyprus, particularly after their liberalisation in 2001, did not give 
any indication of currency misalignment. 
As mentioned earlier, a major justification for a strong and stable 
exchange rate prior to euro adoption, was the openness of the economy and 
the significant share of imports in domestic production.  These characteristics 
would undermine possible nominal devaluations as they would swiftly lead to 
an increase in inflation and a real appreciation of the currency.   In this context, 
it should be noted that 28% of the goods included in the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) basket of 2005 were imported.   
A complementary line of thought in assessing the appropriateness of 
the parity in case of a fixed exchange rate regime is to assess interest rate 
differentials vis-à-vis the interest rates of the currency anchor.  As described 
earlier, in the case of Cyprus short-term interest rates were exceptionally raised 
on 30 April 2004 by 100 basis points widening the spread vis-à-vis  euro   
interest  rates.  At the same time, long-term interest rates had risen 
disproportionally, reflecting a range of factors that did not appear to be related 
either to expectations of higher inflation or other structural changes associated 
with the exchange rate outlook.  More specifically, it should be pointed out 
that the increase in the yield of the 10-year government bond, which refers to 
only one primary auction in June 2004 - as there was no secondary market for 
government paper - reflected the high financing needs of the government at 
the time and a ‘correction’ of the yield curve, which was previously very flat 
due to excess liquidity11.  Successive primary auctions suggested a clear 
downward path of long-term interest rates, falling from 6,58% in June 2004 to 
5,89% by end-February 2005 and to 4,44% in April 2007.  
 The ability of both the private and government sectors to borrow from 
abroad constitutes another important indicator of the confidence that foreign 
investors showed in the exchange rate and in the performance of the domestic 
economy as a whole.  It should be noted that the government had always been 
able to finance its foreign debt comfortably, never facing repayment problems 
and with no external assistance, with the exception of a few years following the 
Turkish invasion in 1974.  In the decade leading to euro adoption, the 
government issued on five different occasions a European Medium Term Note 
(EMTN), a five-year issue on two occasions and three 10-year issues, which 
 
10 Due to the significant interaction of Cypriots with foreign tourists and entrepreneurs, foreign notes had 
been widely traded semi-officially in non-bank institutions such as hotels and retail shops.  At no time 
was there any evidence that the parallel market exhibited any signs of misalignment vis-à-vis the official 
market.   
11 Characteristically, it should be mentioned that the 10-year development stocks previously had a spread 
of about 50 basis points only vis-à-vis the German bunds.   
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were oversubscribed.  The spreads over LIBOR ranged between 12 and 74 
basis points.  The highest spread was recorded in 1999, a few months after the 
financial crisis in Russia, which had caused turbulence and uncertainty in the 
international markets.  The lowest spread was recorded in April 2007, eight 
months prior to euro adoption.  Furthermore, it should be noted that the 
private sector in Cyprus managed to attract funds from abroad with relative 
ease.  For instance, in 2007 the issuance of bonds in euros by the largest 
commercial banks in Cyprus had been very successful, with the issues being 
comfortably oversubscribed.  
Another important indicator to examine within the context of an 
investigation of the appropriateness of the exchange rate parity, is the level of 
the current account deficit and its dynamics.  As already mentioned, past 
current account deficits in Cyprus had been comfortably financed through the 
financial account. Even though it could be argued that such deficits might 
constitute a source of concern, it should be noted that the Cypriot economy 
had been growing rapidly during the last three decades, experiencing a 
successful and smooth catching-up process.  This process justified the existence 
of a current account deficit, particularly if this was largely due to the impact of 
capital and intermediate goods and largely financed by non-debt creating 
inflows, such as FDI.  In fact, FDI coverage of the current account deficit had 
been significant, albeit volatile, over the years, averaging close to 60% for the 
period 2000-2007.  
A significant portion of the FDI inflows in the island relate to business 
services and the real estate and construction sectors, which registered 
significant growth during the period 2000-2007, especially following EU entry. 
More specifically, a large number of properties in the costal areas of the island 
were bought by foreigners, mostly British expatriates. Other sectors such as 
financial intermediation, trade and transport also registered notable FDI flows 
during this period. Furthermore, it should be noted that the most important 
contribution to the high FDI inflows in the sectors mentioned above came from 
recorded “reinvested earnings”. A particular feature of this is that as an 
accounting entry, profits earned by activities of foreign companies in Cyprus 
are first registered as an outflow in the current account balance (through the 
income account) and then as inflows financing the current account, namely 
through FDI.  This double entry results in a deterioration of the recorded 
current account deficit owing to the accumulation of profits of foreign 
companies, even though their profits are not expatriated. 
An additional useful angle from where one can view the exchange rate 
issue is the analysis of the evolution of the country’s export market shares.  
Even though Cyprus’s export market share in goods had worsened in recent  
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years, due to  a decline of re-exports as well as stagnant domestic exports, this 
was partially offset by the significant increase in the export market share of 
services (other than tourism).  Available balance of payments data shows that 
rapid growth was recorded in several categories of services exports such as sea 
transportation and financial and other business services, which includes legal 
and accounting services. 
In view of the above arguments, international institutions and analysts 
in general acknowledged the strength of the balance of payments position of 
Cyprus and its overall external stability, which were directly related to the 
appropriateness of the exchange rate parity of the Cyprus pound.  For 
instance, credit rating agencies in their periodic assessment of sovereign risk in 
Cyprus did not, by and large, raise the issue of possible exchange rate 
misalignment or of current account sustainability, except in the theoretical 
context of pointing to the risks and repercussions of not achieving fiscal 
consolidation12.  Furthermore, in reports on the Cyprus economy issued 
during the period under consideration the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 
suggested that the parity of the Cyprus pound was broadly appropriate. For 
instance, in the report issued in March 2005, it argued that a devaluation in 
view of ERM II entry was unlikely (EIU, 2005).  In the June 2007 report, the EIU 
stated that Cyprus was expected to adopt the euro as scheduled on 1 January 
2008.  Finally, it should be noted that since September 2001 the IMF had 
included Cyprus in its Financial Transaction Plan on the basis of its stable 
balance of payments position.  As a result, Cyprus was one of the 49 members 
of the IMF with a creditor status.   
 
3.2   An assessment of effective exchange rate indices 
This section focuses on effective exchange rates (EER) indices which are used 
to analyse and assess exchange rate developments and competitiveness issues.   
These indices constitute a useful tool for monitoring overall exchange rate 
developments in a country by tracking changes in the average value of the 
domestic currency vis-à-vis a basket of other currencies, typically those of the 
country’s principal trading partners. 
In its nominal form, an EER index of a country is a weighted average of 
bilateral exchange rates with the country’s trading partners.  The index can be 
constructed in a variety of ways, with the main differences largely lying in the 
selection of the currencies and their weights in the basket.  The selection of 
currencies is typically based on a variety of indicators, such as the direction of 
either total trade of goods or exports and imports of goods and services.  The 
 
12 The last sovereign risk assessments prior to euro accession were undertaken by Fitch (July 2007) and 
Standard & Poors (January 2007).  
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so called ‘third country competition‘ weights are often used to calculate the 
index so as to reflect not only bilateral competition with trading partners in 
their respective home markets, but also bilateral competition in export markets 
elsewhere13.  Besides its nominal form, an EER index for a country is also 
derived in real terms, that is it is adjusted through price or cost.  Real effective 
exchange rates (REER) are considered to be more relatively informative 
indicators, capturing changes in the price or cost competitiveness of the 
economy.   
Even though EER indices are very useful and are widely used, they 
suffer in general from limitations related to data comparability but also to 
inherent conceptual and methodological problems.  To address these caveats, a 
number of different weights or methods are typically used for their 
computation in order to produce a wide range of indicators so as to enhance 
their usefulness and the robustness of their results.  No single index is 
problem-free or clearly superior in all cases.  
A number of representative REER of the Cyprus pound are depicted in 
Figures 3a and 3b.   In Figure 3a the real IMF index and the real and nominal 
IMF-based indices, as constructed by the authors, are presented. The above-
mentioned real index is deflated by the consumer price index.  Figure 3b 
shows the same index using weights derived by ECB staff (Buldorini et al, 
2002). The course of all of the indices depicted in Figures 3a and 3b roughly 
track those of a wide range of other EER indices for Cyprus, including those 
constructed by the ECB and the European Commission.  Overall, the analysis 
of EER indicators for Cyprus suggests that in both nominal and real terms the 
Cyprus pound had remained broadly stable since the 1990s, exhibiting some 
strengthening since 2001 following its weakening in 1999-2000.  This pattern 
broadly followed changes in the value of the euro, the currency anchor of the 
Cyprus pound.  In addition, however, the real index which exhibited a 
stronger appreciation since 2006, also reflects the hike in inflation in Cyprus in 
2002 and 2003 due to the harmonisation-induced increases in excise taxes 
during this period and the increase in VAT from 10% to 13% on 1 July 2002 
and from 13% to 15% on 1 January 2003.   
 
 
13 For instance, even though for the period examined there were no bilateral trade relations with Turkey, 
the double export weights for Cyprus include the Turkish lira as Cyprus and Turkey compete in third 
markets, e.g. tourists from the UK market.  
 
Figure 3a:  Real and nominal effective exchange rates of the Cyprus pound 
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Sources:  IMF, CBC. 
 
Figure 3b:  Real and nominal effective exchange rates of the Cyprus pound 
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Sources: IMF, CBC. 
Overall, the movements of the EER in the years leading to euro 
adoption suggest that the strengthening of the euro and the relatively steep 
increase in inflation in Cyprus in the years 2002 and 2003 led to an 
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appreciation of the real index between 2001 and 2006, with ranges of between 
5% to 10%, depending on the index used. 14 
The REER indices for Cyprus deflated by unit labour costs typically 
exhibited a steeper appreciation than the CPI deflated indices.  Nevertheless, it 
should be pointed out that in addition to increased international comparability 
problems of unit labour costs, the indices used often refer to the labour costs in 
manufacturing, which in the case of Cyprus is not a representative sector due 
to its small and decreasing share in GDP.  What is more important for 
competitiveness in Cyprus is labour costs in the tourism sector, which in recent 
years have dampened down due to the influx of foreign workers.     
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that non-tourism services can be 
thought of as being less price sensitive than the manufacturing or the tourism 
sectors. 
An overall assessment of the EER indices of the Cyprus pound suggest 
that, despite the strengthening of the currency between 2001-2006, the parity 
was not far from historical levels, economic fundamentals or the levels that 
could be justified by Balassa-Samuelson effects.  Also, the appreciation in this 
period partly reflects a ‘correction’ or a reversal from the weakening trends in 
1999-2000.   In addition, the appreciation of the Cyprus pound was fuelled by 
the increase in inflation due to harmonised induced increases in VAT and 
excise taxes in 2002 and 2003, which were not expected to have an impact on 
export competitiveness, with the exception of some services, including 
tourism.   
 
 
4.  Applications of equilibrium exchange rate models for Cyprus 
As mentioned earlier, in order to have a robust view of the broad range within 
which the equilibrium exchange rate lies, it is in general advisable to 
investigate a variety of indicators and models.  In this context, to complement 
the qualitative assessment undertaken in Section 3, a quantitative approach for 
estimating the equilibrium exchange rate for the Cyprus pound is presented in 
this section.  Three concepts of exchange rate equilibrium are described, 
namely short-run, medium-run and long-run equilibrium, followed by a 
survey of recent empirical applications of several models for the case of the 
 
14 It should be noted that for the case of Cyprus the CPI is used instead of the Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices (HICP) as in the case of other European Countries, due to the unavailability of the HICP 
for Cyprus for the years prior to 1995.  For 1995 onwards, when data for both indices of Cyprus exist, the 
CPI is always lower, typically between 0,2  and 0,3 percentage points.  
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Cyprus pound.  Subsequently, the application of a medium-run model is 
undertaken, namely the FEER model15.  
 
4.1  Concepts of equilibrium exchange rate  
It is commonly accepted that there exists no unique and widely accepted 
definition of what an ‘equilibrium exchange rate‘ is.  A number of different 
definitions capture various aspects of this multidimensional issue.  One of the 
notable attempts to define the equilibrium exchange rate was that of 
Williamson (1985) who stated that:   
 
“…the equilibrium exchange rate is that real exchange rate which 
is expected to generate a current account surplus or deficit equal 
to the underlying capital flow over the cycle, given that the 
country is pursuing internal balance as best it can and not 
restricting trade for balance of payments reasons…” (p.5) 
 
In the literature, the various concepts of exchange rate equilibrium are 
categorised on the basis of the time horizon to which they apply.  Three 
different broad concepts of equilibrium exchange rates are often discussed, 
namely short-term, medium-term and long-term equilibria.  In brief, a short-
term equilibrium refers to the real exchange rate which prevails under free 
market conditions when fundamental values are at their current settings, after 
abstracting from the influence of random effects. A medium- term equilibrium 
rate is defined as the real exchange rate for an economy which is in both 
internal and external balance.  Internal balance is achieved when demand 
meets the supply potential and the economy is running at full capacity (full 
employment conditions).  External balance is achieved when the rest of the 
world is in internal balance.  This equilibrium does not necessarily imply that 
the current account of the domestic economy is balanced.  The current account 
balance can be in deficit at a level that can be considered as sustainable, in the 
sense that it is consistent with the dynamics of convergence with the flow 
equilibrium in the long-run.  A long- term equilibrium is defined as the real 
exchange rate in an economy which has achieved stock equilibrium (steady 
state conditions).    
 
15 The original background work by the authors for the 2005 and 2007 decisions include a long-run 
model, i.e. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) model, which is not presented here.  It essentially constitutes a 
quantitative analysis of the effective exchange rate indices in Cyprus, which were also analysed in this 
paper in qualitative terms (Section 3.2).  
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4.2  Existing empirical evidence for Cyprus 
Several studies were carried out prior to euro adoption on the appropriateness 
of the exchange rate parity of the Cyprus pound, in the context of assessing the 
competitiveness of the economy.  The general conclusion of these studies, 
which apply to the three aforementioned time horizons, is that the value of the 
Cyprus pound was broadly in line with economic fundamentals and hovered 
within ranges that are considered to be near equilibrium. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated a FEER model for 
Cyprus in 1998 in the context of the Article IV Consultation (IMF, 1998). 
During subsequent visits by the Fund in 2000 and 2002, the model was 
updated (IMF, 2000 and 2002).  The general conclusion of these studies was 
that even though policies related to the fiscal stance and the containment of 
labour costs needed to be strengthened to safeguard long-term sustainability, 
the central parity of the Cyprus pound was broadly in line with economic 
fundamentals.  The same conclusion was reached during the Article IV 
Consultation exercise shortly before Cyprus’s entry into ERM II, where it was 
stated that:  
 
”The staff agreed that the parity appeared to be broadly in line with 
fundamentals given that the economy is near full employment and the 
reserve position remains strong” (IMF, 2005, p.14).   
 
In the subsequent report, two years later, it was noted that ’the real 
exchange rate is in line with fundamentals’ (IMF, 2007, p.17).  In the latter two 
IMF Report the conclusion was reached not on the basis of a FEER model, as 
was the case in 1998, 2000 and 2002, but on the basis of a thorough and 
comprehensive analysis of a variety of relevant indicators for Cyprus.   
  Pattichis et al (2003) estimated a Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange 
Rate (BEER) model for the Cyprus pound.  This was a purely statistical model 
which attempted to find cointegration between the real effective exchange rate 
and a number of behavioural variables, namely the terms of trade, the Balassa-
Samuelson effect, net foreign assets, the price of oil and the real interest rate 
differential.  The authors reported one cointegrating vector which closely 
followed the real effective exchange rate, suggesting that the parity of the 
Cyprus pound was not significantly misaligned for the period 1980 Q1 – 2000 
Q3. 
A third study by Maeso–Fernandez et al (2004) used a panel PPP model 
to examine the currencies of EU members, including the new member states. 
The results of this study also suggest that the central parity of the Cyprus  
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pound was not far from the fundamental equilibrium.  In fact, based on the 
PPP model, the Cyprus currency was found to be marginally undervalued in 
2002. 
It is important to underline that the above models were applied to 
recent reference periods and that they were related to all three different time 
domains, namely short-run (BEER), medium-run (FEER) and long-run (PPP).  
This reinforces the soundness and robustness of their common conclusion and 
suggests that the Cyprus pound was indeed broadly in equilibrium during the 
last few years leading to euro adoption.  Against the background of these 
empirical results, the aim of this paper is to use the most recent available data16 
for the further understanding of the impact of recent domestic and external 
developments on the equilibrium exchange rate in Cyprus.  As mentioned 
earlier, we proceed with an application of an estimation of a FEER model. 
 
4.3   An application of the FEER model for Cyprus  
The FEER model is a medium-run equilibrium exchange rate model, which 
focuses on the requirements for simultaneously achieving internal and external 
balance in a country.  It is widely used in the literature as it provides useful 
insights for policymakers into the role of exchange rates in achieving 
equilibrium.  The model attempts to reconcile the current account which 
would have prevailed if exchange rates reflected conditions where both 
domestic and foreign outputs were in equilibrium, the so called “trend current 
account” (or underlying current account), with the current account level which 
is considered as the ‘sustainable current account‘ (or equilibrium current 
account).  This ‘sustainable current account balance‘ reflects a level which can 
be considered as ‘normal‘, given the differences in a number of structural 
macroeconomic features between the domestic economy and the economies of 
the country’s trading partners.  To the extent that the ‘trend‘ and the 
‘sustainable‘ levels of the current account differ, the model estimates the 
exchange rate that is needed to restore equilibrium, the so called ‘fundamental 
equilibrium exchange rate‘.  
The time domain within which the FEER model is estimated assumes 
that asset stocks are changing.  In other words, long-run equilibrium has not 
yet been reached.  Therefore, only a flow-equilibrium is envisaged in this 
medium-term framework as opposed to the stock-equilibrium which is 
assumed in a long-term horizon model.  As a consequence of this feature, the 
medium-term current account balance need not be equal to zero for an 
economy experiencing real GDP convergen c e .   I t  i s  i n  t h i s  s e n s e  t h a t  a  
 
16 As was mentioned in Section 3.1, a revision of balance of payments data was undertaken for the recent 
years.  Our study is the only econometric study that takes into consideration the new data.  
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country’s sustainable current account can be negative, depending on some 
structural macroeconomic features of its economy, including its level of 
development or real convergence, its fiscal stance and demographic 
characteristics. 
It is important to note that the FEER analysis produces a result that is 
independent of nominal magnitude.  Thus, the FEER is a real exchange rate 
which is consistent with a range of nominal exchange rate and price 
combinations.  Therefore, if the REER is found to be overvalued 
(undervalued), it does not necessarily mean that a nominal depreciation 
(appreciation) is required; the equilibrium could in principle be restored 
instead through relatively lower (higher) domestic inflation vis-à-vis foreign 
inflation.   
As is often the case in the literature, a partial equilibrium approach of 
estimating the FEER model17 is used which consists of three distinct steps: a) 
the estimation of the country’s trend (or underlying) current account, that is 
the current account that would prevail in the country if its economy and the 
rest of the world were producing at potential output levels;  b) the estimation 
of the sustainable current account of the country in question, that is the current 
account deficit which is consistent with the savings/investment position of the 
domestic economy, also assuming that the rest of the world is operating at 
potential output; and c) the estimation of the real exchange rate, namely the 
FEER, that is required to equalise the trend current account with the 
sustainable level of the current account.  
Isard and Mousa (1998) refer to a fourth step in the process, namely the 
judgmental assessment of the outcome of the third step in order to take into 
consideration in a qualitative way any relevant factors that have not been 
adequately addressed by the formal analytic framework.  Whether it is called a 
fourth step, or is simply considered as an integral part of the overall 
assessment of the process, the judgemental aspect of the analysis is very 
important in drawing up conclusions from this exercise.  Furthermore, when 
the FEER is estimated, a sensitivity analysis is usually carried out with respect 
to the level of the sustainable current account and the elasticities used for the 
 
17  An alternative way to calculate FEER is to use a complete macroeconomic model.  This has the 
advantage of consistency and of producing FEER estimates for a number of years in the future.   
However, the validity of the results depend on the specification of the model and if the model does not 
have well defined medium or long-term properties, the FEER estimates will not make sense. The 
alternative approach, the partial equilibrium approach used in this paper, has the advantage of simplicity 
and clarity, at a cost however of compromising the structural consistency offered by a complete 
macroeconomic model.  The partial equilibrium model does not capture the possible feedback from the 
FEER to the inputs for trend output and structural capital flows.  In other words, it assumes that trend 
output and structural capital flows influence the FEER but not the other way.  Nevertheless, it should be 
pointed out that Driver and Wren-Lewis (1996) report that the reciprocal effects not captured in the 
partial equilibrium model are relatively small.   
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estimation of the trend current account.  In the following subsections, each of 
the aforementioned steps of the process are presented, followed by an overall 
assessment of the results. 
 
4.3.1   Estimation of the trend current account 
We estimate the FEER model using annual data spanning from 1980 to 2006, 
the latest year for which annual data were available during the period of the 
euro adoption discussions in mid-2007.  For the calculation of the trend current 
account, trade and services flows were treated as behavioural equations in a 
partial equilibrium model, whereas trend output and structural capital flows--
dividends, interests and transfers--were treated as exogenous18.  More 
specifically, the current account, CA, was considered as a function of the real 
exchange rate, R, domestic and foreign incomes, Y and Y*, and net capital 
payments, Interest Payments and Dividends (IPD): 
 
        CA = f(R, Y, Y*) - IPD 
 
Following the work of Driver and Wren-Lewis (1998), the flow equations 
(exports of goods XG, exports of services XS, imports of goods MG and imports 
of services MS) were modelled as a function of domestic income   
Y, world income Y,* relative prices R and world trade S, in log-linear form: 
 
    XG =a1 *R  +  a2 * S 
        XS = b1 *R  +  b2 *Y* 
        MG = c1 * R +  c2 * Y   
        MS =d1 *R +  d2 * Y  
 
The deflators used were assumed to be a weighted function of 
commodity prices, domestic prices and world export prices.  Commodity 
prices were divided into five categories: oil prices, food prices, world 
beverages prices, world agricultural non-food prices and world metals and 
minerals prices.  Their relative importance for trade prices was derived from 
the commodity composition of trade.  For trade in services, export prices were 
proxied by domestic consumer prices (CPI) and import prices were proxied by 
OECD consumer prices expressed in domestic currency.   
  
 
18 The model consists of nine endogenous variables; domestic real GDP (Y), exchange rate (e), foreign 
assets (A), domestic real interest rate (i), exports of goods (X), imports of goods (M), consumption (C), 
capital stock (K) and one of the three variables: government spending (G), taxes (T) and government debt 
(B); and six exogenous variables; world output (YW), world real interest rate (iw), debt to foreign 
residents (D), employment (N), and two of the following three variables: government spending (G), taxes 
(T) and government debt (B).  
Income and price elasticities for goods and services used in the 
estimation of the trend current account were based on the average elasticities 
estimated by two different studies, the International Monetary Fund (1998) and 
Kyriacou and Syrichas (1999).  These are presented in Table 2.  Finally, for the 
estimation of trend output, which is treated as exogenous, we applied the 
commonly used HP filter. 
 
 Table 2:  Trade elasticities used in FEER estimation 
   Exports Imports    
Goods      
Price  0,90 1,55 
Income  1,35 2,00 
       
Services      
Price  0,50 1,40 
Income  1,00 1,20 
 
The estimated trend current account balance for Cyprus for the period 1990-
2006 is presented in Figure 4 along with the actual current account balance.  A 
noteworthy characteristic of the trend variable for Cyprus is that it is in general 
smoother than the actual current account balance and in some years it differs 
significantly.  This appears to be a natural consequence of the small size of the 
economy, where exogenous factors, both positive and negative, have a 
significant impact on economic magnitudes.19  Finally, it should be noted that 
overall, as expected, the trend current account balance evolves broadly in line 
with the developments in the REER index. 
 
Figure 4:  Trend (TCA) and actual current account (ACA) deficit 



















































































































         
Source: CBC calculations. 
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19 For instance, in 1992 the current account deficit was burdened by a number of exogenous factors, such 
as the purchase of aircraft by Cyprus Airways and exceptionally higher defence imports amounting to 
6,8% of GDP.  
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4.3.2 Estimation of sustainable current account 
As mentioned earlier, the ‘sustainable current account balance‘ represents a 
level which can be considered as ‘normal‘ or medium-term, given the 
differences in a number of structural macroeconomic features between the 
domestic economy and the economies of the country’s trading partners.  One 
of the options for deriving the sustainable level of the current account, which 
was also used in this paper, is through the assessment of the ‘normal‘ level of 
the savings-investment balance, which depends on a number of medium-term 
determinants20.   
The level of the current account that can be maintained in the medium-
run, given the savings/investment position and full-employment conditions 
prevailing in both Cyprus and its trading partners, was estimated using a 
panel of countries consisting of Belgium, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and the UK.  
Following the work of other researchers, including the IMF, a number of 
variables were tested as candidates for explaining variations in the sustainable 
current account.  Based on tests for statistical significance, our model includes 
the dependency ratio, per capita GDP and the cyclically adjusted budget 
deficit21.  
The derived sustainable current account balance for Cyprus is presented 
in Figure 5, along with the trend current account discussed earlier.  It should 
be noted that the sustainable current account deficit is decreasing over time, 
(less negative balance) which is consistent with economic fundamentals and 
the catching up process.  This result is consistent with the work of the 
International Monetary Fund (1998 and 2000).       
 
 
20 An alternative approach used in the literature is to estimate the deficit that generates sufficient trade 
surpluses in the future, in order to at least stabilise the existing debt-to-GDP ratio at a sustainable level. 
21 The panel estimation method followed in this case was the within group estimation so as to eliminate 
the group and time specific fixed effects.  It is, however, possible that a more thorough analysis could 
have been carried out in this panel estimation.  More precisely, panel unit root tests and cointegration 
could have been carried out as well as a panel endogeneity test.  Recent preliminary estimates by the 
authors on the twin deficits hypothesis suggest that this proposition holds in the case of Cyprus, which 
would be interesting to test in the panel group.  For the above reasons, the sustainable current account is 
used with caution and sensitivity analysis is carried out when conducting FEER estimation, as an 
alternative solution.   
 Figure 5: Trend (TCA) and sustainable (SCA) current account deficit 
































































Source: CBC calculations. 
 
4.3.3 Estimation of the FEER  
In view of Figure 5, which presents the sustainable and trend current account 
balances, the question that needs to be addressed is what level of real exchange 
rates is required in order to alter the trend current account deficit so as to set it 
equal to the sustainable current account?  This, of course, presumes that the 
Marshall - Lerner condition holds. 
Before addressing this question for the case of Cyprus, some practical 
considerations need to be mentioned at the outset.  Due to the inherent 
limitations of the simplified analytical framework of the FEER model, it is 
recognised in the literature that the quantitative assessment provided by this 
model includes significant margins of errors that need to be taken into account.  
For instance, Isard and Mussa (1998) note that in the absence of formal 
confidence bands, the IMF considers that deviations from estimates of 
equilibrium exchange rates of 10% or even 15% as being non-significant.   
Moreover, they note that the range of 10% or 15% serves not as a definite 
signal for a serious misalignment but rather as a threshold suggesting the 
existence of such a possibility. 
           Bearing  in  mind  the  above  considerations,  Figure  5  shows  that  the 
sustainable and trend current account balances move relatively close to each 
other for the period 1990-2006.22  The recorded deviations exceeded the 
aforementioned 10% margin only in the period 1999 – 2000, in which case the 
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22 It should be noted that the results did not change materially in the context of a sensitivity analysis 
conducted both with respect to the level of the elasticities used in the estimation of the TCA and the level 
of the SCA.  
euro was significantly undervalued.  Therefore, the FEER estimation suggests 
that the Cyprus pound has been broadly in line with fundamentals during the 
period examined .  For this period, the FEER estimations suggest that the 
Cyprus pound hovered close to fundamentals with a tendency of being 
slightly weaker than the equilibrium exchange rate during the years 1995-2002.  
For the period 2003-2006, the model suggests that the exchange rate was 
slightly stronger, albeit well within the region of what could be considered as 
‘broadly in equilibrium‘.  It is also noted that FDI coverage in these years is 
very high.    As noted above, a rule of thumb applicable generally is that small 
deviations do not require action by the authorities, given the margins of error 
involved in the analytical framework of these models.   
 
 Figure 6: Comparison of FEER estimations with calculations for REER 















































































































Source:  CBC calculations. 
 
5. Conclusions and forward considerations          
The introduction of the euro on 1 January 2008 was a landmark event in the 
recent history of Cyprus.  The economic benefits of joining the euro area are 
well known for a small and open economy.  Adopting the credible currency of 
a monetary union offers, among other things, economic stability and security, 
reduced transaction costs and exchange rate risk and, given the credibility of 
the ECB, a macroeconomic environment of low inflation and interest rates.   
The use of the exchange rate policy tool in Cyprus was never exercised in the 
country’s recent history and, therefore, the loss of this tool would not 
constitute a serious constraint on policymakers.  In addition to the economic 
benefits, political benefits are also important given the catalytic role that the 
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euro can have on the ongoing efforts for a political solution of the Cyprus 
problem (see Kyriacou, 2006).23 
The analysis presented in this paper supports the view that the 
exchange rate parity of the Cyprus pound vis-à-vis the euro remained broadly 
in line with economic fundamentals for a number of years leading to the time 
of Cyprus’s entry into the euro area on 1 January 2008.  This conclusion is 
supported by evidence from a qualitative examination of a wide range of 
relevant economic variables in Cyprus available at the time of economic 
assessment, that is the first half of 2007 (Section 3). It is also supported by an 
econometric analysis based on a FEER model for Cyprus, using yearly data 
from 1980 to 2006 (Section 4).  Overall, the evidence examined in this paper 
suggest that the decision taken on 10 July 2007 by ECOFIN to adopt the long 
standing central parity rate of the Cyprus pound vis-à-vis the euro, that is, 
CYP1=€1,7086 or €1=CYP0,585274, as the irrevocable conversion rate, was 
appropriate. 
The choice of an appropriate conversion rate is certainly of critical 
importance when joining a monetary union.  Nevertheless, and despite the 
significant benefits of joining the euro area, policy challenges for Cyprus 
continue to exist and policymakers need to remain vigilant.  In general, in an 
increasingly complex and competitive global environment, policy challenges, 
be it within or outside a monetary union, are growing dramatically.  In the 
particular case of Cyprus these challenges relate not only to economic, but also 
to political considerations.   
Looking forward and from an economic policy perspective, 
strengthening the competitiveness of the Cyprus economy is a primary 
challenge for the authorities.  In this context, implementing further market 
oriented structural reforms and strengthening macroeconomic stability is a 
prerequisite for balanced and sustainable economic growth.  
For a member of a monetary union, the economic policy challenges are 
well known.  The role of fiscal policy and structural reforms in successfully 
managing the economy enhancing its competitiveness and maintaining 
macroeconomic stability takes centre stage.  This is because in this framework 
the tools of monetary and exchange rate policies are no longer available to the 
domestic authorities for addressing economic shocks.  In this environment, 
economic policy-making has to largely focus on fiscal policy and structural 
reforms with the aim of rendering the economy more flexible and competitive 
as well as more resilient to shocks.  This is of paramount importance in order 
to safeguard sustainable growth, employment and welfare in the increasingly 
 
23 It should be recalled that the analysis presented in this paper covers only the areas under the effective 
control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.  
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competitive international environment.  Wage moderation and increased 
productivity contribute importantly to achieving this goal.  Needless to point 
out, the above policies are easier said than done.  In order to be successfully 
implemented, they require strong political will and leadership.  As the recent 
economic and financial crisis has shown prudent economic policies need to be 
implemented and safeguarded during the good times, before a downturn or 
crisis develops.  This adds to the credibility of the authorities and signals their 
capability to manage an economic crisis effectively, if and when it emerges.   
As shown in the appendix, this challenge proved to be extremely demanding 
in Cyprus, at least in the three-year post euro-adoption period. 
As regards the political challenges facing the Cypriot economy, it could 
be argued that a possible reunification of Cyprus following euro area 
membership would, from an economic perspective, be  very challenging, more 
so than in the case where Cyprus was not a member of the euro area.  More 
specifically, given that: (i) the absence of monetary and exchange rate policy 
instruments, and (ii) the significant  income disparity between the economy of 
the Republic of Cyprus and the economy in the occupied northern part of the 
island, one could raise the concern that following reunification, 
macroeconomic policy would be very difficult to implement without facing 
significant policy dilemmas.  Nevertheless, against this argument, it should be 
pointed out that the relative magnitudes of the two economies (approximately 
90% versus 10% in terms of GDP) suggest that the short-term impact of 
reunification can be a manageable challenge, assuming reasonable conditions 
related to  the political solution.  As such it can be addressed with the help of 
transfers, from European structural funds, where needed, and within the 
context of the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact.  In addition, it 
should be pointed out that over a medium and long-run horizon the impact of 
reunification would be beneficial to both economic areas of the island. This, of 
course, is subject to an assumption of a sensible economic policy framework to 
be derived from the political negotiations and also under reasonably prudent 
policies after the solution.  Given the above, the adoption of the euro by the 
Republic of Cyprus is not likely to impede the implementation of the solution 
but, on the contrary, it can be a catalyst for a solution, as pointed earlier.  This 
is because the euro is a currency already familiar to the Turkish Cypriots and 
widely used and preferred in the north as a foreign currency.  The choice of 
currency in the envisaged Unified Republic of Cyprus in the 2003-2004 
negotiations proved to be very sensitive and one of the thorniest issues given 
the existence of the Cyprus pound which Turkish Cypriots could not accept 
politically.  This was not the case in the more recent talks, owing to the wide 
acceptability of the euro.  
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It can be argued that early versions of the UN sponsored plan for the 
solution of the Cyprus problem, the so called “Anan Plan”, did not safeguard 
the sustainability and the financial viability of a united Cypriot economy (see 
Eichengreen et al, 2004).  Nevertheless, the involvement of technical 
committees on economic issues during the negotiations in early 2004 
contributed to introducing a number of improvements of the economic 
provisions of the 5th version of the Anan Plan vis-à-vis its earlier editions.  A 
number of these improvements have been based on Eichengreen et al (2004).  
Nevertheless, it appears that more needs to be done.  It is hoped that in the 
context of the renewed political talks since 2008 and the help of a working 
group on economic matters consisting of both Greek Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriot economists, further improvements in the economic provisions of an 
envisioned solution will be incorporated in order to safeguard the island’s 
economic and financial viability.   
In general, there are a number of important issues that need to be 
addressed in the context of an envisaged solution in order to safeguard the 
competitiveness of the unified economy.  For instance, the principle of free 
movement of goods, capital, labour and services within a single market should 
be safeguarded. Also, in achieving economic and social convergence between 
the two existing economies the agreed policy framework should give emphasis 
to fiscal prudence and financial soundness strictly within the context of the 
Stability and Growth Pact.  It is thus of paramount importance that fiscal 
policy in the Republic of Cyprus is also geared towards delivering fiscal 
outcomes that would also be appropriate in the context of the short-term costs 
arising from the implementation of a solution to the Cyprus problem. 
All in all, despite the number of unique features and characteristics of 
the Cypriot economy, the main principles for the appropriate policies needed 
to address economic challenges are standard and straightforward: maintain 
fiscal discipline and promote structural reforms with a view to maintaining a 
business friendly economic environment and improving the competitiveness 
of the economy.  This will promote sustainable growth and enable the 
economy to absorb exogenous shocks.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Post euro-adoption reflections 
 
Following the ECOFIN decision of 10 July 2007, and given the associated boost 
to consumer and investor confidence, domestic demand surged in Cyprus, 
leading to economic overheating which lasted until the end of 2008, when the 
impact of the global financial and economic crisis began to affect the island.  
The economic overheating, also associated with the influx of foreign funds for 
the acquisition of holiday homes in the coastal areas of the island, was also 
fuelled by an increase in credit growth, facilitated by the significant reduction 
of the minimum reserve ratio on 1 January 2008 from 5% to 2% of euro 
deposits. 
In the light of the above developments the current account deficit rose 
sharply to 17,7% of GDP in 2008, also leading to concerns about 
competitiveness.  Needless to say, for some sectors of the Cyprus economy, e.g. 
manufacturing and tourism, competitiveness in recent years has been 
gradually eroding.  Nevertheless, other sectors have been contemporaneously 
expanding, outweighing the losses.  Such sectors include financial, shipping 
and other business services, which, along with the construction sector 
mentioned earlier, have by and large supported economic growth in recent 
years.  An important question to be addressed is the degree to which the post 
euro-adoption worsening of the current account is a reflection of an overall 
deterioration of competitiveness or a result of aforementioned overheating as 
well as other exogenous factors.  Given the sharp increase of the current 
account deficit in 2008, and the close attention that external imbalances have 
attracted in the light of the economic and financial crisis, this question is of 
vital importance and is examined below. 
Developments on the current account deficit in Cyprus and its main 
components are presented in Table A.1 for the years 2006- 2009.  As mentioned 
earlier, the year 2006 was the last year to be included in the econometric 
analysis conducted and the current account deficit was found to be at a level 
consistent with equilibrium.24 
 
 
24 It should be recalled that at the time of completing the exercise, the preliminary figure for the current 
account in 2006 was somewhat lower than the final figures, that is, 5,8% of GDP. 
  
 
Table A1:  Main components of the current account in Cyprus, 2006-2009  
                    (as a percent of GDP). 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Current account balance -7,0 -11,7 -17,7 -8,5 -10,7 9,1
Goods and services balance  -4,0 -6,5 -11,7 -5,3 -7,7 6,5
Income account and current transfers  -2,9 -5,2 -5,9 -3,2 -3,0 2,7
Total Imports of goods (FOB) 34,9 36,5 38,8 30,8 3,9 -8,0
Imports of goods destined for home consumption (FOB) 31,4 33,6 36,1 28,7 4,8 -7,5
of which
consumption goods/ durable 1,2 2,1 2,1 1,9 0,9 -0,2
intermediate inputs and raw materials 9,4 10,3 10,9 8,1 1,5 -2,8
transport 3,8 5,1 5,1 2,9 1,2 -2,1
oil 5,2 5,1 6,5 4,7 1,3 -1,8
Export of goods  7,7 6,8 6,7 5,7 -1,0 -0,9
of which
domestically produced goods 3,1 3,2 3,2 2,8 0,1 -0,3
Services payments 16,2 17,2 16,9 13,9 0,7 -3,0
of which
travel 5,3 6,7 6,1 5,3 0,8 -0,8
transportation 5,9 5,6 6,4 5,3 0,5 -1,1
Sea 4,1 3,5 3,7 2,6 -0,4 -1,0
Air 1,8 2,0 2,7 2,6 0,9 -0,1
Services receipts 39,4 40,3 37,3 33,7 -2,1 -3,6
of which
travel 13,0 12,3 10,8 9,1 -2,2 -1,6
financial services 1,7 3,3 4,3 4,7 2,6 0,4
other business services 9,6 9,0 8,1 8,2 -1,5 0,1
transportation 9,2 9,7 10,3 9,1 1,1 -1,2
Sea 6,4 6,4 7,9 7,4 1,5 -0,5
Air 2,6 3,1 2,3 1,6 -0,4 -0,7
Government services 2,1 2,3 1,0 0,9 -1,1 -0,1  
Source: CBC. 
 
The table attempts to shed light on the developments that led to the 
sharp increase of the current account from 7% in 2006 to 17,7% in 2008 and its 
subsequent reduction to 8,5% in 2009. In a nutshell, what Table 3 suggests is 
that a significant portion of the deterioration of the current account between 
2006 and 2008 can be attributed to exogenous factors and the overheating of 
the economy.  Nevertheless, losses in the competitiveness of some sectors of 
the economy, particularly the tourist sector, continued to take place, even 
though other sectors, especially financial, shipping and services, outweighed, 
at least to some extent, these losses. 
More specifically, column 6 of the table, which shows the difference 
between current account items in 2006 and in 2008, suggests that the 
deterioration of the current account deficit between these two years reached 
10,7 percentage points of GDP, from 7,0% in 2006 to 17,7% in 2008.  This 
deterioration can be decomposed into a widening by 7,7 percentage points in 
the goods and services balance and 3 percentage points in the income account 
and current transfers.  It is asserted that for the examination of the sustainable 
current account balance what is directly relevant is the first component, 
namely the goods and services balance.  In fact, this is the emphasis given by 
the FEER methodology, which was applied in Section 3 of this paper.  
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More specifically, as column 6 shows, the 7,7 percentage point 
deterioration of the goods and services balance from 2006 to 2008 can be 
mostly explained by a sharp increase in imports for home consumption of the 
order of 4,8% of GDP and a significant decline in export of services by 2,1% of 
GDP.  Analysing further these two main categories, nominal imports sharply 
increased due to oil imports (1,3% of GDP) and import of transport equipment 
(1,2%).   These categories of imports do not relate to competitiveness but rather 
to exogenous factors, that is, the increase in the price of petroleum products 
and the decline in excise tax on cars introduced in November 2006, 
respectively25.   
In addition, a large portion of imports appears to be related to the 
overheating of the economy, especially in the construction sector.  As noted 
earlier, the demand for holiday houses in Cyprus by foreigners increased 
significantly in recent years, contributing to the overheating of the economy.  A 
corollary of these developments was the sharp increase in imports related to 
the building of holiday homes such as raw materials, intermediate goods, etc.  
It can then be reasonably assumed that the increase in the imports of this 
category (by 1,5%) can be largely attributed to the overheating of the economy 
in the construction sector and not to the erosion in competitiveness.  The same 
argument can be used for the case of durable goods (such as electric appliances 
and furniture) which increased by 0,9 percentage points in the period 
examined.  
In addition to the changes in imports analysed above, the category of 
exports of services contributed to the significant worsening of the current 
account deficit, particularly the goods and services balance, by 2,1 percentage 
points, between 2006 and 2008.  Indeed, of this deterioration of exports of 
services, loss of competitiveness in the tourist industry seems to play a 
significant role as the sector shrunk by 2,2 percentage points of GDP during 
the two-years period examine26.  It should be pointed out, however, that other 
sectors increased their contribution, such as shipping (sea transportation)  and 
the financial services sector which as a percentage of GDP increased by 1,5 and 
2,6 percentage points, respectively.  Also, the overall shrinkage of exports of 
services as a percent of GDP between 2006 and 2008 is attributed to some 
extent to an exogenous factor, that is, the reduction of the category 
“government services” by 1,1% of GDP. This reflects the reduction in the funds 
transferred to the British military bases in Cyprus and can be considered to be 
 
25 Cyprus is neither an oil producing nor a car manufacturing country. 




                                                
exogenous, i.e related to UK developments rather than a consequence of 
competitiveness erosion.  
A reflection of the largely cyclical nature of the current account deficit 
increase between 2006 and 2008, is its sharp reduction in 2009, following the 
reversal of economic overheating and the recording of negative growth in the 
year.  The current account deficit declined to 8,5% of GDP whereas the goods 
and services balance levelled at 5,3% of GDP, which is 1,3% higher than the 
2006 level.  Therefore, the current account deficit, although reduced, continues 
to remain at relatively high levels. It is true that in 2009 the tourism sector 
continued to decline and this partly reflects the erosion of competitiveness. 
Nevertheless, the adverse economic environment in 2008-9 has affected the 
sector globally and with a normalisation of the economic environment some 
rebound should be expected. This is true also for other services sectors in the 
Cyprus economy which have demonstrated a dynamic performance in recent 
years such as shipping, other business services as well as financial services27. It 
is likely that, ceteris paribus, with the normalisation of the global environment 
these sectors will rebound thus contributing to both higher growth and 
improved current account balances.  
In addition to the analysis highlighted above, of the exogenous and/or 
one-off factors that have affected the current account deficit in the post-euro 
adoption period, one should also acknowledge that policy decisions in Cyprus 
also had an impact on the current account developments. Useful insights into 
the interpretation of recent current account developments can be provided by 
revisiting the policy challenges mentioned in Section 5. More specifically, the 
role of fiscal policy and structural reforms, which was underlined in the 
context of a monetary union, has to be taken into account. Since entry into the 
euro area, development in the fronts of fiscal policy, wages, credit and 
structural reforms in Cyprus have not been in line with what might be 
considered as necessary to maintain healthy economic fundamentals.  These 
developments, against the background of a sharply increasing current account 
deficit, lead to concerns about the appreciation of the real exchange rate and 
competitiveness erosion.  
As Table A2 shows, the fiscal deterioration from 2007 to 2009 was 
particularly acute and only partly attributable to the adverse economic 
environment.  A fiscal surplus of 3,4% of GDP in 2007 rapidly turned into a 
deficit of 6,1% in 2009. Public expenditure increases have been exceptionally 
and unsustainably high, increasing from 42,2% of GDP in 2007 to 46,4% in 
2009, despite lower interest payments.  This sharp increase in public 
 
27 For instance, sea transportation as a percent of GDP increased from 6,4% in 2006 to 7,9% in 2008, 
shrinking to 7,4% of GDP in 2009.  
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expenditure coincided with increasing private consumption fuelled by a 
dramatic increase in private credit growth.  The fiscal developments have also 
had a substantial negative impact on debt dynamics.  The downward trend of 
the public debt to GDP ratio was swiftly reversed in 2009 with the risk of 
reaching unsustainable levels if no measures are undertaken. In fact in his 
address to the Employers’ and Industrialists’ Federation in March 2010, the 
Minister of Finance stated that with no corrective structural measures the 
public debit might increase to beyond 80% of GDP by 2013.  
 
 
Table A2:  Selected macroeconomic indicators for Cyprus  
                    and the euro area, 2006-2009 
 
  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Unit labour costs (rate of growth)*         
Cyprus    0,6 1,1 2,4 4,0 
Euro  Area  1,0 1,6 3,3 3,7 
Compensation per employee (rate of 
growth)* 
       
Cyprus    3,0 2,9 3,4 2,9 
Euro  Area    2,3 2,5 3,2 1,4 
Fiscal deficit (%of GDP)         
Cyprus   -1,2  3,4  0,9  -6,1 
Euro  Area  -1,3 -0,6 -2,0 -6,3 
Public Debt (% of GDP)**         
Cyprus   64,6  58,3  48.4  56,2 
Euro Area  68,3  66,0  69,4  78,7 
Credit growth**         
Cyprus  ***  10,9 23,4 19,5  8,4 
Euro Area  10,8  11,2  5,8  -0,1 
 
Sources:  Cystat, CBC calculations and SDW (ECB). 
 
*  Based on physical persons  
**   Loans to non-MFIs, excluding general government   
***  Domestic residents loans to non-MFIs by MFIs excluding companies without a physical presence  
 
At the same time wages have increased in the public and some other 
sectors exercising pressure on unit labour costs.  For instance, in 2009 the wage 
bill in the public sector increased by 8,8 %. And this was a year of recession in 
Cyprus with unemployment rising to levels never experienced in the economy 
since the Turkish invasion in 1974.  As a result unit labour costs in 2009 grew at 
a much higher rate than in previous years and at a higher rate compared with 
that of our euro area partners (Table A2).  
  35
These developments highlight the importance of the need to maintain 
appropriate economic policies.  The competitiveness of the economy does not 
depend only on the nominal exchange rate. In order to preserve 
macroeconomic stability and the competitiveness of the economy real variables 
matter.  All economic policies need to be geared towards that end, including a 
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